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Comment on The Plain English Movement 
David S. Cohen * 
On first impression, the private and social benefits of plain 
English contracts and perhaps of plain English legislation seem 
obvious. Theoretically, by using contracts drafted in simple 
language we may increase consumer comprehension of 
contractual terms, engender more accurate contract decision- 
making, and promote more precise pricing of contract goods. 
Perhaps consumers who understand their contractual obligations 
will be more likely to fulfil them. Commercial goodwill may 
flower, and the use of plain English contracts has been advertised 
as a selling tool.' This approach to plain English, which reflects 
the views of Mr. Felsenfeld, fails to address or to analyze 
thoroughly several major assumptions and implications of plain 
English contracts. 
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that plain 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. 
1 The argument has been made that the voluntary decision by many commercial enter- 
prises to adopt plain English contracts is a thinly disguised attempt to increase their 
respective market shares. See Black, "A Model Plain Language Law"; 33 Stan. L. Rev. 
255 (1981), at pp. 263-4. 
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English contracts may carry more risks than benefits; the 
approach may, in fact, present a regressive stage in the evolution 
of consumer law. The reasons for this decidedly negative 
appraisal are as follows. First, plain English contracts and legis- 
lation are not the only vehicles for achieving increased inform- 
ation access in consumer contracting. Plain English should not be 
evaluated in the abstract, but must be assessed on a relative basis 
with these alternative tools. Second, because plain English 
contracts use the process of market transfer to encourage inform- 
ation flow, the result may be a disproportionate level of benefits 
being received by a limited, select group of consumers. Third, 
plain English legislation, as Mr. Felsenfeld admits, has focused 
on simplicity of language which may not bring about a concom- 
itant reduction in the complexity of contracts. A consideration of 
the amount of information which we attempt to include in 
consumer contracts reveals that simplicity of language is not 
enough. A related point is that there are more than two actors 
involved in contract drafting; the judiciary which will be inter- 
preting the contracts, and lawyers who will be redrafting and 
interpreting these contracts are left out of the equation by plain 
English proponents. It is my view that subsidiary reforms must 
also take place in the approach and method of judicial interpreta- 
tion. A fourth concern with the plain English movement is that it 
reintroduces a concept of contract as a bilateral event rather than 
a multilateral process, focusing judicial attention on a discrete, 
simple document, with the possible result that the reality of 
consumer decision-making may become less relevant to a deter- 
mination of legal rights. My fifth concern reflects a cynical but 
realistic appraisal of the likelihood that any amelioration of 
consumer contracts will come about as a result of the plain 
English movement.. The conceptual complexity of a great deal of 
contractual information, the difficulty of inter-contract compar- 
isons of the value of various mixes of price and non-price terms, 
and the contracting process itself, persuade me that all that will 
result is the transfer of paper bearing simple language. It is 
unlikely that there will be a corresponding transfer of informa- 
tion, and even less likely that this information will be processed, 
analyzed and used in the transactional process. 
My first concern relates to any evaluation of plain English legis- 
lation which fails to take into account both the existing vehicles 
for increasing access to information in the consumer transactional 
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process, and such alternative methods of achieving that end as 
may not yet be in place. While Canadian law does not now enjoy 
plain English legislation it is arguable that common law and 
statutory doctrines of unconscionability which focus on proce- 
dural dysfunction in the contracting process2, and judicially 
crafted concepts of reasonable notice of unusual or onerous 
contract terms3 may be applied to afford relief to consumers who 
apparently bind themselves to poorly drafted, archaically 
worded, inordinately complex consumer contracts containing 
unusual and substantively onerous terms. At the same time the 
potential threat of the application of these doctrines provides an 
economic incentive to suppliers of consumer goods and services 
to introduce clarity into their contractual documents. In addition, 
provincial trade practice legislation regulating deceptive 
marketing and selling techniques is drafted in broad enough 
terms to afford relief to consumers who are misled, or are likely 
to be misled4 when faced with contractual and extra-contractual5 
2 Leff, "Unconscionability and the Code - the Emperor's New Clause", 115 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 485 (1967); M. J. Trebilcock, "An Economic Approach to Unconscionability" in 
B. J.  Reiter and J. Swan, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto, Butterworths 1980), Study 
11, p. 379. See American Home Improvement Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A. 2d 886 (use of 
terms so obtuse and archaic that a layman is not capable of understanding them). Article 
2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code adopts a similar approach in requiring certain 
exclusion clauses to be conspicuous in order to  be enforced. Legislative intervention in 
several provinces supports the view that the statutory doctrine of unconscionability will 
include judicial review of the contract process, and of the consumer's ability to under- 
stand the agreement. See the Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 2(b)(i); 
Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 4(2)(b); the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 
R.S.A. 1 9 8 0 , ~ .  U-3, s. 4(l)(b); the Trade Practices Act, S. Nfld. 1978 ,~ .  10, s. 6(1)(n. 
See Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R.  (3d) 400,18 0. R. (2d) 601 
(C.A.); R. Hasson, "The Unconscionability Business - A Comment On Tilden Rent- 
A-Car Co. v. Clendenning", 3 C.B.L.J. 193 (1979). 
4Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 3(1); the Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 
1980, c. 55, s. 2(a); The Unfair Trade Practices Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. U-3, s. 4(l)(d). See 
Director of Trade Practices v. Household Finance Corp. of  Can. (1977), 33 C.P.R. (2d) 
284, [I9771 3 W.W.R. 390 (B.C.C. A.). In Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties 
Inc., 365 A. 2d 442 the argument was made that technical and archaic language violated 
a state statutory prohibition against "any other fraudulent conduct which creates a 
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding". 
By "extra-contractual" I mean to  say that trade practice legislation has discarded the 
common law distinction between contract terms and representations which do not give 
rise to contractual liability. Generally, the legislation refers to representations, that is, 
statements which influence consumer decision-making. While the details of the legis- 
lation differ from province to province, the legislation is uniform in so far as it discards 
the contractlnon-contract distinction. See Belobaba, "Unfair Trade Practices Legisla- 
tion: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection", 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327 
(1977), at pp. 336-7. 
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representations which are deceptively drafted. The point to be 
made is that plain English may not be necessary or appropriate in 
all consumer contracts. In addition, trade practice legislation 
recognizes that contract is not bilateral, and accordingly the legis- 
lation regulates deceptive practices of all enterprises which disse- 
minate information to  consumer^.^ Finally, common law 
doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable notice permit a 
flexibility of application which statutory plain English legislation 
may not. Any evaluation of plain English contracts and legis- 
lation must assess the benefits of the movement against these 
existing tools. 
More importantly, the plain English movement must be 
evaluated against an approach which will provide consumers with 
comparative information about consumer products, services, and 
contract terms prior to the time at which their decision to enter 
into the transaction becomes effectively irrevocable. If we are 
concerned with consumer transactional decision-making, which 
of necessity will involve significant search costs, we ought to be 
providing comparative data of price and other primary contract 
terms.' At the very least we might consider structuring our legal 
6 The legislative philosophy which becomes apparent on close examination is that tradi- 
tional contract analysis, which focuses on a bilateral event is an overly simplistic and 
unrealistic model in reflecting legal relationships. See Goldberg, "Toward an Expanded 
Economic Theory of Contract", 10 J. of Econ. Issues 45 (1976), at pp. 49-52; Macneil, 
"Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a 'Rich 
Classificatory Apparatus"', 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1018 (1981); Macneil, Contracts: 
Exchange Transactions and Relations, 2d ed. (1978). The concept of contractual relations 
as distinguished from discrete events may reflect, as well, a view of decision-making as 
multilateral negotiations. In the consumer context, this would recognize that expecta- 
tions, influence and remedial behaviour, both legal and non-legal in form, exist between 
consumers and direct suppliers, distributors, advertisers, individual sales employees and 
manufacturing enterprises. The legislation explicitly recognizes this perspective in 
severely limiting the traditional contract doctrine of vertical privity. Belobaba, supra, 
footnote 5 at pp. 340-1. See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 1 (definition of 
supplier); the Unfair Business Practices Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. U-3, s .  l(h) (definition of 
supplier). 
7 This is one of the services provided by consumer organizations in Canada and the United 
States. See R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Little, Brown & 
Co., 1977), p. 84. An example of this comparative information is The Standard Cox Life 
Insurance Tables, which is a compilation of life insurance premium price data. (See The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto, December 10, 1979).) The Quebec government has for 
several years funded a popular consumer magazine (Protegez-vous) with a circulation of 
several 100,000 which provides comparative data on numerous consumer products and 
services. The provision of information about one product, without comparative informa- 
tion, simply does not permit the consumer to make an informed decision to choose more 
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system to promote the private investment necessary to acquire, 
collect, evaluate and distribute that information prior to 
contracting. Perhaps comparative information will not be 
provided either by suppliers of goods or by private organizations 
organized for that p ~ r p o s e . ~  If that is so, then we might seriously 
contemplate providing information about available contractual 
offerings out of public funds. Plain English contracts appear, at 
least on first impression, to be a terribly inefficient vehicle for 
reinforcing inter-contractual comparison of contractual terms. 
My point again is simply that plain English legislation must be 
evaluated on a relative basis with full appreciation of the benefits 
of existing approaches and potential alternatives. 
My second criticism of plain English legislation and contracts is 
a response to the presumption underlying the movement that 
consumers are homogeneo~s .~  We are repeatedly referred to 
"the consumers", all of whom stand to benefit from the redesign 
and redrafting of contracts, and all of whom apparently will 
benefit equally. The truth of the matter is far more complex. 
Purchasers of some kinds of consumer goods and services may be 
drawn from  articular socio-economic classes. Some consumers 
have little orLno education, others have business experience, and 
still others have law degrees. Research bears out one's intuitive 
impression that the plain English movement may benefit a 
certain, limited class of consumers who are highly motivated to 
acauire information. assess contractual risks and take those risks 
into account when making purchase decisions.1° These consumers 
or  less of the desired good (whether that "good" is safety, durability, contractual 
remedies on breach, service facilities, notice terms or  any other legal right set out in the 
contractual document) which will be recognized by the court. An alternative approach is 
to provide "labelling" information which depicts the relevant quality of a product, on a 
relative basis. Hirschhorn, Product Safety Regulation and the Hazardous Products Act, 
Technical Report No. 10, Economic Council of Canada (1981), at pp. 77-8. 
8The reasons for this non-disclosure range from the "public good" nature of a great deal 
of consumer information, market instability giving rise to a "high information depreci- 
ation rate", the private costs of disclosure to the supplier, and non-competitive 
marketing environments. See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 409; Posner, supra, 
footnote 7 at pp. 80-4. 
9 A similar argument may be made on the side of commercial enterprise. Plain language 
legislation may have a disproportionate impact on small businesses which may be 
carrying on business in a very competitive environment. Leete, "Plain Language Legisla- 
tion: A Comparison of Approaches", 18 Am. Bus. L. J. 511 (1981), at p. 517. 
lo I admit, of course, that, in theory, the behaviour of this segment of the market may 
influence the contract terms available to non-marginal consumers. See text at footnotes 
69 to 72, infra. 
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may in fact be those who would have been most likely to benefit 
from contractual information presented in traditional contract 
form." Thus, the distributive consequences of the approach may 
be less than satisfying. If one assumes that all or some of the 
costsI2 of the plain English movement are passed on to all 
consumers as part of the price of the consumer good, a large 
sector of the public may unwittingly be subsidizing benefits 
received by a small, elite sub-class of consumers. The evidence 
suggests that, while lower socio-economic classes may stand to 
gain more from disclosure of information than other groups 
(since arguably they begin with less information), disclosure laws 
may in fact worsen the relative position of the poor. Such laws, 
instead of reducing the gap between rich and poor, may operate 
to give a net advantage to the "average" consumer.13 The expla- 
nation for the potential discriminatory impact of plain English 
and disclosure laws includes the fact that the poor may be disad- 
vantaged to the extent that their particular background informa- 
tion, relative ability to process conceptual information, and 
educational levels may distort their comprehension of decidedly 
complex contractual terms.14 In addition, income disadvantages 
may play a significant role in the ability of the poor to invest in 
search costs necessary to evaluate transactional information on a 
comparative basis. Finally, the poor may suffer from market 
segregation in "contract terms",15 similar to the segmentation of 
11 Davis, "Protecting Consumers From Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical 
Look at the Simplification of Consumer Credit-Contracts", 63 Va. L. Rev. 841 (1977), 
at pp. 842, 844; National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the 
United States, (1972), at pp. 176-7. 
l2  These costs, while likely to be of a capital nature, are not insignificant. Virtually every 
description of plain English legislation stresses the inordinate amount of time, effort and 
money invested in redrafting consumer contracts. Experts from several disciplines are 
necessarily involved in the process, and the drafting process must take into account not 
only business risks and evaluation of legal consequences, but also language, syntax, 
style, sentence structure and length, format, colour and numerous other variables. See 
Black, "A Model Plain Language Law", supra, footnote 1 at p. 260. 
13McNeil, "Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the Impact of Consumer 
Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry", 13 Law & Soc. Rev. 695 (1979), at pp. 697- 
701; Ganvood, "A Look at Truth in Lending - Five Years After", 14 Sant. CI. L. Rev. 
491 (1974), at pp. 500-3. 
l4  Davis, supra, footnote 11 at pp. 847-56; Schroder, Driver and Streufort, Human 
Information Processing (1967), pp. 109-15; Andreasen and Best, "Consumer Response 
to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and 
Obtaining Redress", 11 Law & Soc. Rev. 701 (1977). 
15 See Leff, "Contract as Thing", 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131 (1970). In this essay, the contract 
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product markets along income lines. Research suggests that 
markets which serve a disproportionately high concentration of 
low income consumers may provide lower quality goods, exhibit 
less competition and perhaps have more marginal sellers than 
other markets.16 It is reasonable to suppose that the contractual 
terms distributed in these markets may be similarly skewed. If so, 
plain English legislation may simply represent a net gain to 
middle income consumers. Like so much consumer protection 
legislation and initiatives, the movement may benefit only those 
members of the special interest groups which support it. 
The third point which must be raised in any assessment of the 
plain English movement is the scale against which one measures 
simplicity. As Mr. Felsenfeld and others have pointed out, a 
central object of the New York Plain English law has been to 
improve "readability".17 This itself poses some second order 
decisions relating to the standard of readability against which 
consumer contracts are to be measured,18 and relating to the 
degree of sophistication with which one approaches the task of 
improving readability, however we choose to define the term. 
While arguments may be raised in favour of a vague New York 
standard of readability, equally persuasive arguments may be 
made to support an objective quantitative standard or scale 
against which a particular contract is measured. Perhaps a 
"reasonableness" standard coupled with legislatively crafted 
criteria which the courts are directed to use when assessing a 
particular contract is a more suitable approach.19 In view of my 
later remarks, I do not consider the issue to be terribly important, 
itself, as distinguished from the product distributed is viewed as a product bought by 
consumers. 
16See Schnapper, "Consumer Legislation and the Poor", 76 Yale L.J. 745 (1967); 
Andreason, The Disadvantaged Consumer (1975), pp. 36-54. 
l7 What is meant by readability is comprehension or understandability. This is the object 
of the plain English movement, and apparently is the attribute which the various quanti- 
tative tests employed in assessing plain English contracts are designed to measure. The 
New York legislation requires contracts to be "written in a clear and coherent manner 
using words with common and everyday meanings": N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law, s. 5-702(a) 
(McKinney Supp. 1980-81). 
See Black, supra, footnote 1 at pp. 278-80. Apparently, General Motors has developed 
a computer programme which assesses "readability". See Drafiing Documents in Plain 
Language (Practising Law Institute, 1979), pp. 97-106; Redish, "Readability", ibid, pp. 
163-4. 
l9 Black, supra, footnote 1 at pp. 273-85. See 1980 N.J. Sess. Law Sew. 492 (West), c. 125, 
ss. 2,lO. 
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although on balance I concur with the view that a vague 
"understandability" standard is apt to secure a more sensitive and 
realistic approach to the drafting of these contracts than is an 
objective standard. 
My concern on this point relates rather to the emphasis placed 
on readability, with a concomitant reduction in attention to and 
emphasis on the issue of information load. An assumption under- 
lying the New York plain English law is that information compre- 
hension is maximized primarily by improving the readability of 
consumer contracts. There can be little doubt that syntax, 
grammatical structure, layout and design, colour, captions and 
headings, sentence structure and length, the use of non-technical 
language, and similar efforts to reduce obscurity of language are 
necessary elements of a comprehensive information 
programme.20 As Mr. Felsenfeld points out, however, this is only 
part of the battle. An important element in the redrafting of 
consumer contracts is the elimination of content. This involves 
the considerable risk that substantive legal rights will be affected 
by this process of literary surgery. This risk is, none the less, a 
necessary element in the plain English movement. 
A number of studies have indicated that an individual's ability 
to process information depends, to a significant degree, on the 
amount of information which is presented to him for 
as~imi la t ion .~~ Assuming this to be true, how does plain English 
legislation operate to reduce extraneous clauses and needless 
clutter? Furthermore, if the legislation or approach does mandate 
brevity, who is to decide what goes in and what comes out? The 
answer, of course, is the supplier of the contract. Even'a 
rudimentary understanding of the place of contractual documents 
in contract law suggests that a reduction in contract terms will 
take place in only one direction. 
I begin with the thesis that one purpose of contract law is to 
20 This is not to say that plain English legislation ought to establish detailed rules for all 
these variables. Connecticut apparently has attempted to do precisely that:,Pub. Act. 
No. 79-532, s. 2(c), 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts 776. 
21 See Davis, supra, footnote 11 at p. 846; Leete, supra, footnote 9 at p. 512; Whitford, 
"The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions", [I9731 Wis. L. 
Rev. 401; Forshey, "Plain English Contracts: The Demise of Legalese", 30 Bay. L. 
Rev. 765 (1978). In Ford Motor Credit Co. v.  Milhollin, 444 U.S.  555, 568 (1980), the 
court said that "MeaningFtl disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it 
describes a balance between 'competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and 
the need to avoid [information overload]'." 
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provide contracting parties with a judicially crafted standard form 
contract,22 and thus to reduce the transaction costs which would 
otherwise be incurred in an attempt to anticipate and to provide 
explicitly for all significant kinds of contractual risk. This 
reduction in transaction costs, including the costs of identifying 
the risks, negotiating the allocation of the risks, drafting the 
document and perhaps enforcement, is complemented by the 
argument that the common law or judicial rule will itself reflect 
an efficient allocation of risk.23 Where the legal background 
consisting of common law or statute law24 would, where the 
contract is silent, allocate a particular risk to the consumer ( i . e . ,  
where the judicial decision would favour the commercial enter- 
prise) it is unlikely that a plain English contract would include 
disclosure of this implicit risk allocation. It is equally unlikely that 
a consumer would be aware of the contingency, and even if he 
were, it is highly unlikely that he would be cognizant of the legal 
allocation of risk. Possible reasons for a decision not to disclose 
this allocation of risk are not difficult to identify. First, the private 
costs of this "warning" of contractual risk will be borne entirely 
by the seller. Second, disclosure of this risk may encourage 
aggressive bargainers, once they have access to this information, 
to attempt to bargain for a reallocation of risk to the commercial 
enterprise. There is little reason to suspect that the latter will wish 
to accept the contingency, or even to engage in the negotiations. 
Finally, the supplier may point to the plain English interest of 
brevity and simplicity as a reason for silence. Whatever the 
reason, the result will be non-disclosure of material risks 
allocated by the common law or statute to consumers. Thus, the 
plain English movement, when assessed in light of these private 
incentives towards material non-disclosure25 has serious implica- 
22 See Fuller and Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law, 3rd ed. (1972), pp. 89-103; Tullock, The 
Logic of the Law (1971), pp. 35-47. 
23 See text at footnotes 32,33, infra. 
24 For example, the use of appropriate language in a contractual document will trigger the 
operation of provincial sales legislation, or perhaps federal negotiable instruments law. 
Legal concepts drawn from the general law outside the terms of a contractual document 
cannot possibly be disclosed in the contract itself. This function of common law and 
legislation was expressly recognized by the House of Lords in Ashington Piggeries Ltd. 
v. Christopher Hill Ltd. ,  [I9711 1 All E.R. 847 at p. 881 per Lord Diplock. 
See Kronman, "Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts", 7 J .  of 
Leg. Studies 1 (1978); Posner, "Strict Liability: A Comment", 2 J .  of Leg. Studies 205 
(1973), at p. 211; Green and Moore, "Winter's Discontent: Market Failure and 
Consumer Welfare", 82 Yale L.J. 903 (1973), at p. 907. 
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tions. Plain English contracts which leave out information of 
greater significance than the information which is put in, can only 
lead to irrational decisions premised on the remaining 
misleading, albeit simply put, i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
If, on the other hand, prior common law decisions or statutes 
would allocate a particular risk to the seller, common sense, or 
rather self-interest, would demand that the supplier, very simply, 
in very plain English, allocate that risk to the consumer. Thus, 
plain English contracts which take into account information load 
as well as simplicity will become vehicles for disclosing only those 
risks which would otherwise be borne by the commercial enter- 
prise. Mr. Felsenfeld has suggested that altruism and perhaps 
commercial embarrassment will influence commercial enterprises 
to refrain from the most excessive, visible abuses of this otherwise 
inexorable process. Absent strong evidence of this former motive 
in commercial practice, and in light of my later remarks regarding 
the probability of any appreciable modification of consumer 
behaviour, some other indicia to business of what terms ought to 
be left out in the interests of improving comprehension may be 
appropriate. 
One commentator has pointed out that the use of a legal 
concept such as a "security interest", or alternatively a decision 
to remain silent, may be devices to describe extremely complex 
sets of ideas and rules where the result called for by the legal 
concept or silence is in accord with the "ordinary expectations 
and experience" of consumers.27 However, in a great many cases 
consumers have no expectations as to the allocation of a great 
majority of contractual risks. To ask the courts to engage in a 
fruitless search for a fictional intention is not likely to produce a 
rational outcome. In addition, there is a serious risk that what is 
an "ordinary expectation and experience" must be derived at 
least in part from prior law and previous contracts. The result 
may be that traditional substantive allocations of risk will 
continue unabated. 
Another approach is to eliminate all information which is not 
sufficiently valuable to justify the increased information load, and 
26 See Landers and Rohner, "A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending", 26 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. 711 (1979), at p. 730. 
27 Procaccia, "Readable Insurance Policies: Judicial Regulation and Interpretation", 14 
Is. L. Rev. 74 (1979). 
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which is too complex to be communicated ef fec t i~ely .~~ This 
approach, while attractive, necessitates a relatively precise calcu- 
lation of the effect of an additional bit of information on human 
decision-making. In addition, we are told that what is or is not 
"valuable" is to be determined by assessing the likelihood that 
the creditor will in fact rely on the legal right established by the 
term in light of the impact of the occurrence of the contingency 
on his business enterprise. If the term has rarely if ever been 
relied upon in fact, it is termed non-essential and, therefore, 
ought to be excluded in the interests of consumer comprehension 
of the remaining terms. As a starting point, this definition of what 
is "essential" fails to take into account that the occurrence of a 
specific contingency may have an impact which varies with time, 
economic conditions, cost of money, and with the severity of the 
loss or damage suffered. Equally important, it fails to consider 
what lawyers and judges will do with the contract if and when the 
contingency does occur.29 
Finally, I might add that terms which are unenforceable 
pursuant to provincial l eg i~ la t ion ,~~  or which are likely to be held 
unenforceable through the application of common law or 
statutory principles of unconscionability and the like, must be 
excluded from plain English contracts. Those terms not only add 
to information load and thus reduce comprehension, they 
actually reduce awareness of the actual allocation of responsi- 
bility in law.31 It seems trite to say that a term which effectively 
28 Davis, supra, footnote 11 at pp. 900-04. See Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at 
pp. 723,734. 
29 See text at footnotes 33 to 36, infra. 
30 An obvious example would include a clause purporting to permit a secured creditor in 
British Columbia to seize consumer goods, and to sue for the deficiency owing on the 
debt obligation. See Chattel Mortgage Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 48, ss. 23, 25(1); Sale of 
Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, s. 19. Another instance of such a 
clause would be an attempt to abrogate the implied conditions under sales legislation in 
several provinces. See the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 87, s. 34; the 
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C200, s. 58 as amended; Sale of Goods Act, 
R.S.B.C. 1979 ,~ .  370, s. 20. 
31 The New York Plain Language law has not, apparently, eliminated this practice. See 
Siegel, "Drafting Simplified Legal Documents" in Drafting Documents in Plain 
Language (Practising Law Institute, 1979), p. 190. See Black, supra, footnote 1 at pp. 
286-87. The point has been made that at least one province has enacted legislation which 
establishes that the inclusion of such clauses is a violation of the Act, giving rise to the 
imposition of a fine or  a term of imprisonment. See the Consumer Products Warranties 
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, s. 7(2) as amended. It is possible that provincial trade 
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misleads a consumer into believing that he is under a legal 
obligation when he is not, or which purports to deny the existence 
of legal rights which in law cannot be varied, directly contradicts 
the object of the plain English movement, which is to facilitate 
the processing of transactional information. 
I referred earlier to the failure of the plain English movement 
to consider fully the likely consequences of a judicial resolution of 
a dispute where a plain English contract is either silent on a 
private allocation of risk, or perhaps uses an ambiguous or 
technical term. Economic theorists,32 and more recently the 
courts in the application of d0ctrine,~3 have adopted as an explicit 
analytical tool the argument that where the contract is silent, the 
court should allocate the risk to the party who could have avoided 
the loss by taking appropriate preventive measures, or alterna- 
tively could have assumed the risk through liability insurance or 
self-insurance, at the lower cost of the two parties. If one adopts 
this analysis, silent consumer contracts will often result in an 
allocation of risk to the commercial enterprise which is apt to 
have more accurate information as to the risk, obtained at a lower 
cost, and which can take advantage of economies of scale to 
prevent or  insure against the risk at a marginal cost lower than the 
consumer's. If that is how the courts will resolve disputes in the 
future, and I have no reason to believe that they will not, I 
foresee substantial intrusions into the concept of brevity and 
reduced information load, as more and more contingencies 
become "essential" or "~a luable '~  over time, and commercial 
enterprises are faced with absorbing the costs of silence which 
may accompany efficient judicial allocations of risk. 
Related to this issue is an appreciation of the risks inherent in 
practice legislation which prohibits a term which leads a consumer into believing he does 
not have rights where in fact he does, may afford relief in the case of "dishonest" 
contract terms. See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.  406, s.  3(3)(m); Consumer 
Research and Evaluation Branch, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Product 
Liability: Reflections on Legal Aspects of the Policy Issues (1980), pp. 17-18. 
32 See MacKaay, "The Costliness of Information and Its Effect on the Analysis of Law" in 
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, 
Jacob S. Ziegel, ed. (Toronto, Canada Law Book Ltd., 1979), p. 135; Posner, supra, 
footnote 7 at pp. 74-7; Demsetz, "When Does the Rule of Liability Matter", 1 J .  of Leg. 
Studies 12 (1972), at p. 28; Posner, "Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law", 46 
U .  Chi. L. Rev. 281 (1979), at p. 285. 
33 See Photo Production Ltd. v .  Securicor Transport Ltd., [I9801 1 All E.R. 556 (H.L.), at 
p. 568per Lord Diplock; George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v.  Finning Lock Seeds Ltd., 
[I9811 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 476 at p. 480. 
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the application of traditional canons of contractual construction. 
Much of the existing complexity of contracts results from the 
quite rational response of draftsmen to adverse judicial decisions 
based upon distorted and artificial meanings attributed to 
contractual terms.34 If one expects commercial enterprises to 
simplify their contractual documents, and to bear the entire risk 
of any resulting ambiguity, one is apt to be disappointed. Judicial 
concerns with consent and risk allocation carried out through a 
facade of contractual in te rp re ta t i~n~~ can only serve to exacerbate 
contractual complexity. It is one thing to acknowledge the 
incentive effect of rules of interpretation which demand linguistic 
p r e ~ i s i o n . ~ ~  It is an entirely different matter to send out a market 
signal to commercial enterprises to redraft their plain English 
contracts to complicate already precise language, and to include 
explicit additional clauses designed to resolve anticipated 
disputes. The only result will be to shift the risk expressly to the 
consumer, while simultaneously reducing the over-all degree of 
consumer comprehension of the contract terms due to increased 
information load. 
My fourth, and possibly most serious dissatisfaction with the 
plain English movement derives from its apparent assumption 
that the contract is a bilateral, discrete event, rather than a multi- 
lateral process. Plain English advocates apparently adhere to the 
historical view of the contract as a temporally well-defined (in 
fact, instantaneous) reciprocal consensual event: a meeting of the 
minds.37 Prior to the contract there is no legally relevant relation- 
)4 See Holden, Securities for Bankers' Advances (1954), p. 186: 
In view of the fact that a contract of guarantee is a relatively simple transaction, it 
may be thought strange that the guarantee forms employed by the banks are such 
extremely lengthy documents. Even in recent years fresh clauses have been added 
to them. The highly-skilled legal advisers employed by the banks try to  foresee 
every possible contingency but, alas, even they are not gifted with the wisdom of 
Solomon, with the result that very occasionally a guarantor is able to  escape 
liability. When that happens, yet another clause is added and, in this fashion, the 
mesh around future guarantors is drawn tighter and tighter. 
35See, for example, Wallis, Son & Wells v.  Pratt & Haynes, [I9111 A.C. 394 (H.L.) 
(exclusion of warranties will not exclude conditions); Webster v .  Higgin, [I9481 2 All 
E. R. 127 (C. A.); George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v .  Finning Lock Seeds Ltd. ,  supra, 
footnote 33. See generally G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 4th ed. (London, 
Stevens & Sons, 1975), pp. 141-2; Waddams, The Law of Contracts (Toronto, Canada 
Law Book Ltd., 1977), pp. 282-3. 
See Procaccia, supra, footnote 27 at p. 79. 
37 This approach to contract formation - the model of discrete events -has for too long 
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ship, and after the contract the parties' legal relationship is 
unamendable except perhaps by another contract.38 Accordingly, 
plain English movement advocates assume that all of the inform- 
ation in a plain English contract must be given to the consumer at 
once. He is expected to read the document, assimilate the inform- 
ation, place a value on the various risks and contingencies 
described in the document, assess those risks in light of risks 
described in competitors' contracts, reflect on the relative value 
of the risks in the context of the actual product or service being 
transferred, and make a purchase decision. To describe this 
"event" is to admit that it does not take place. 
Decades of legal reform have been directed at an expansion of 
the legally relevant temporal boundaries of contract l a ~ , ~ 9  and at 
an expansion of the legally relevant parties who participate in the 
process of contract formation. Some authors have advocated an 
obligation of good faith bargaining in the pre-contractual phase of 
sales contracts.40 "Pre-contractual" damages are recoverable in 
contract,41 in recognition of the fact that complex commercial 
arrangements may involve a large number of parties whose 
relationships are interdependent and evolve over time. Trade 
practice legislation expressly 'establishes that legally relevant 
representations may occur before, at the time of, and subsequent 
been the focus of classical Anglo-Canadian contract jurisprudence. See P. S. Atiyah, 
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 427. The 
view corresponds, as Professor Macneil has pointed out, to neo-classical economic 
analysis of exchange "in which no duties exist between the parties prior to contract 
formation, and in which the duties of the parties are determined at the formation 
stage": Goldberg, supra, footnote 6 at p. 49; Macneil, "The Many Futures of 
Contract", 47 So. Cal. L. Rev. 69f (1974). 
38 See Gilbert Steel Ltd. v.  University Const. Ltd. (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 606,12 O.R. (2d) 
19 (C.A.). 
39 AS one commentator has quite correctly expressed it, "A characteristic of certain 
consumer offences is that they are complex, diffused over time and unpublicized": 
Cranston, "Creeping Economism: Some Thoughts on Law and Economics", 4 Brit. J. 
of L. & Soc. 103 (1977), at p. 109. See also Leff, "Injury, Ignorance and Spite -The 
Dynamics of Coercive Collection", 80 Yale L.J. 1 (1970), at pp. 32-3. 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods (1979), at p. 169. Labour 
relations legislation has for decades recognized an obligation to bargain in good faith in 
negotiating a collective agreement: the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 
15; Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, s. 63. I do not mean to say that determining 
what is meant by "good faith" bargaining is a simple task. The point is simply that the 
recognition of formation obligations constitutes implicit legislative acknowledgment of 
the ongoing relationship in contract. 
41 Anglia Television Ltd. v.  Reed, [I9721 1 Q . B .  60 (C.A.); Ogus, "Note", 35 Mod. L.R. 
423 (1972). See also Lloyd v.  Stanbury, [I9711 1 W.L.R. 535 (Ch. D.). 
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to the occurrence of a consumer t r a n s a c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Abolition of the 
par01 evidence rule in consumer  transaction^,^^ increased 
statutory and judicial supervision of advertising and other promo- 
tional a~ t i v i t i e s ,~~  and contractual integration of point of sale 
 representation^^^ evidence a judicial and legislative awareness 
that relevant information influencing transactional decisions is 
received over an extended period of time, and may be dissemi- 
nated by a wide range of enterprises participating in the design, 
manufacture, marketing and ultimate supply of a consumer good 
or service. Protection of expectations in a modern context reflects 
the multilateral nature of contracts, and the temporal elasticity of 
consumer decisions. Plain English contracts may, therefore, 
represent a regressive development in the legal analysis of 
consumer contracts. To the extent that the courts are encouraged 
to focus on a bilateral relationship defined entirely by the terms 
of a discrete printed document, we risk a de-emphasis of the 
realities of transactional decision-making in the consumer 
context. 
Plain English advocates have made the point that one of the 
benefits of the use of plain English contracts is that "because 
consumers can read and understand plain English forms, the 
forms are more likely to stand up in c0urt."~6 If that is so, and one 
might realistically suspect that the apparent amelioration of 
procedural unfairness will engender a greater willingness to 
enforce plain English contract terms, then we have created a tool 
42 See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 3(2). 
43 The Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 4(7); Trade Practice Act, supra, 
footnote 42, s. 28; The Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, s. 9. 
This approach has been advocated on a more general basis. See Law Reform 
Commission of British Columbia, Report on Parol Evidence Rule (1979), at pp. 17-21; 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods (1979), at p. 115. 
@ Much of the recent trade practice legislation deals expressly with representations made 
in advertising and other promotional material. See Trade Practice Act, supra, footnote 
42, s. 2; the Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 4(9). In addition the courts 
have been increasingly receptive to arguments imposing contractual liability on 
manufacturers and direct suppliers of goods founded on representations contained in 
"extra-contractual'' material. See Fuller v. Ford Motor Co. of Can. Ltd. (1978), 94 
D.L.R. (3d) 127,22 O.R. (2d) 764 (Co. Ct.); Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. (1979), 96 
D.L.R. (3d) 113,s B.L.R. 284 (Ont. H.C.J.); Naken v. General Motors of Can. Ltd. 
(1979), 92 D.L. R. (3d) 100,210. R. (2d) 780 (C.A.); Thauberger v. Simon Fraser Sales 
Ltd. (1977), 3 B.C.L.R. 193 (Prov. Ct.). 
45 See Consumer Protection Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 65, s. 10; The Consumer Products 
Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 30, s. 35.1 (new by S.S. 1979-80, c. 17, s. 14). 
46 Black, supra, footnote 1 at p. 264. 
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which focuses judicial attention on the discrete contract event to 
the exclusion of the less visible, but certainly as relevant, extra- 
contractual influences. If one were to rephrase the quotation 
above as "because consumers [do] read and understand plain 
English forms, [have a competitive variety of contract terms 
available to them], [and make purchase decisions on the basis of 
an inter-contract comparison of a range of consumer contracts], 
the forms are more likely to stand up in court", my concern with 
regression would be less valid. However, in the discussion which 
follows I suggest that this revision of the quotation is entirely 
unrealistic. Consumers, even if given plain English contract 
forms, will behave no differently than they do when faced with 
complex contract forms. If that is so, then the mere fact that they 
can read and understand the terms is not especially relevant. 
My point regarding the plain English movement involves an 
assessment of the primary assumption upon which it is based, that 
consumers will not only receive a plain English document, but 
that they will also receive and process the information contained 
in the document and use it in the transactional process. Mr. 
Felsenfeld argues that the ultimate goal of plain English should 
be to influence consumer behaviour. This assumption explains 
the single most important object of the plain English movement: 
to use Mr. Felsenfeld's words, "the general amelioration of 
consumer contracts" ,47 thereby benefiting consumers generally, 
and lessening the impact of my earlier criticism that this kind of 
regulation constitutes a distribution of wealth from the many to 
the few. 
Research and analysis demonstrate that this goal, however 
laudable, is unlikely to 'be attained. Increased disclosure of 
information, even when coupled with some degree of increased 
comprehension, has not apparently resulted in increased compe- 
titiveness in the distribution of sets of contractual terms. A 
preliminary empirical studfa of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act carried out four years after its enactment compared pre-Act 
warranty coverage with post-Act coverage across six i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~ ~  
47 The same point has been made by others. See 119 Cong. Rec. at pp. 972-3. 
See Wisdom, "An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act", 31 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1117 (1979). A more recent published study, which assessed warranties distributed 
in 1975, demonstrated a similar narrow range of available warranties: Gerner and 
Bryant, "Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?", 15 J .  of Cons. Affairs 75 (1981). 
49 These were manufacturers of refrigerators, television sets, automobiles, toasters, digital 
watches and tennis rackets. 
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The data revealed that only one industry had experienced a 
significant modification of its contractual warranty coverage. 
Almost 80% of the contractual warranty terms were unchanged, 
and the remaining demonstrated only a slight shift towards 
increased coverage.50 Even if one accepts that these results are 
not entirely free from uncontrolled variables, and even if one 
discounts their relevance by positing that the pre-Act coverage 
reflected a reasonable level of competition, they cannot be 
entirely disregarded. Notwithstanding the motives of altruism 
and risk of embarrassment offered by Mr. Felsenfeld as possible 
explanations for higher quality contractual terms, suppliers of 
contracts, even plain English contracts, need clear economic 
incentives to alter their product. These market signals will only be 
generated by consumers whose purchase decisions are influenced 
by the information made available to them through the plain 
English movement. If that does not occur, the only product of the 
plain English movement will be well-drafted, simple contractual 
documents which expressly allocate the risk of all major contin- 
gencies to the consumer where silence could result in enterprise 
liability, which remain silent as to risks allocated by law to the 
consumer, and which omit reference to minor, valueless contin- 
gencies. 
The question which must be answered is whether the transac- 
tional process has been or is likely to be influenced by plain 
English legislation or plain English contracts. The object of the 
movement, which is to create a contractual environment in which 
consumers' behavior will be modified by the information they are 
receiving (and in which the information they are receiving will be 
modified by their behavior) is unlikely to be achieved for several 
reasons. Some of these we can do nothing about; others are 
exacerbated by the existing plain English legislation described by 
Mr. Felsenfeld; while still others have been left unattended to. 
The foundation for my position that plain English legislation 
may not have an impact on consumer transacting is quite simple. 
Standard form consumer contracts may be characterized as 
exercises of private legislative power.S1 As others have described 
so Wisdom, supra, footnote 48 at pp. 1137-41. 
51 Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract", 43 
Col. L. Rev. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1960), pp. 362-71; Goldberg, "Institutional Change and 
the Quasi-invisible Hand", 17 J. of L. & Econ. 461 (1974), at p. 484. 
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it, an enforceable consumer contract entered into in a situation of 
monopoly, or quasi-monopoly, or where the industry competitors 
have acted in collusion in drafting the contract is simply the appli- 
cation of private law by one party on to another.52 The consumer 
is offered contractual terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in a 
situation where no second option is available or where all compe- 
titors use the same clause. It is not the lack of bargaining which 
disturbs us; that much is perfectly understandable. The costs of 
negotiation, or even the anticipated costs of potential negotia- 
tion, drafting, pricing and enforcement of even a significant 
percentage of uniquely tailored consumer contracts is 
p r o h i b i t i ~ e . ~ ~  Our concern must be with the availability of the 
alternatives to which a consumer may turn, since any definition of 
non-coercive consumer contracting involves an assessment of the 
existence of an opportunity to make an informed decision among 
a competitive range of alternative choices.54 Our analysis of the 
value of the plain English movement must take into account the 
likelihood that consumers will have this range of choices available 
to them, will understand the particular contractual term at issue, 
will make a rational decision to invest in acquiring information 
about competitive terms, will be able to make a comparison 
among those terms, and will be able to decide upon a particular 
mix of supplier reliability, quality, quantity, price, express 
contractual allocations of primary risks, and implicit contractual 
allocations of primary and secondary risks. If such endeavours 
were costless, if consumers were able to acquire, process, 
comprehend, evaluate and act upon information about compe- 
titive contractual terms at no cost, we would not need to be 
concerned with standard form contracts in their traditional form, 
let alone embark upon the plain English movement. Such inter- 
contract comparisons are not, of course, costless, and thus we 
must assess whether the marginal benefits of the additional 
information exceed the marginal costs of its acquisition, 
processing, evaluation and c o m p a r i s ~ n . ~ ~  
- -- 
52 Gluck, "Standard Form Contracts: The Contract Theory Reconsidered", 28 Int. & 
Comp. L.Q. 72 (1979), at p. 79; Slawson, "Standard Form Contracts and Democratic 
Control of Law Making Power", 84 Haw. L. Rev. 529 (1971). at pp. 552-3. 
53 Llewellyn, "Book Review", 52 Haw. L. Rev. 700 (1939); Posner, supra, footnote 7 at 
pp. 84 et seq. 
" Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 395; Gluck, supra, footnote 52 at pp. 79,80. 
55 See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at pp. 412-19; Schwartz and Wilde, "Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis", 127 
U .  Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979); Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at pp. 718-19. 
Heinonline - -  6 Can. Bus. L.J. 438 1981-1982 
1 98 1 -821 The Plain English Movement 439 
We will presume that a reasonable level of competition exists in 
the industry in respect of contract terms; that we are not dealing 
with a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry structure; and that 
competitors have not colluded in the drafting of contractual 
 document^.^^ But even if one presumes a competitive 
environment in respect of contractual terms, the conceptual diffi- 
culty of the information presented, the information processing 
capabilities of consumers, the environment in which this acqui- 
sition and processing is expected to occur and the search costs 
necessary to draw relevant comparisons, all suggest that the plain 
English contract as a device to "ameliorate consumer contracts" 
is a misdirected endeavour. 
Our object in plain English contracts is not simply to exhibit 
information. We expect that information to be received, 
processed and evaluated by the consumer. Research into 
consumer behavior suggests that a critical variable influencing 
comprehension is the conceptual difficulty of the information 
p r e ~ e n t e d . ~ ~  It is at this point that the nature of contractual 
information becomes critical. Contractual information may 
describe a set of very complex facts. Very often, however, .it 
describes a set of potential future facts, and establishes a second 
set of absolute future facts which will flow from the first. This 
second set will typically describe the legal rights of one or both of 
the parties. The contractual information thus does not merely 
describe facts, but rather creates law, and may involve a level of 
legal complexity which may reduce comprehension to a level 
below that which justifies the cost of the reform. 
56 See Henningsen v.  Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A. 2d 69, 87 (N.J.S.C., 1960); 
Procaccia, supra, footnote 27 at p. 93; Keeton, Insurance Law (1971), para. 2.11. The 
practice of adopting industry-wide contract terms has been magnified by the recent 
practice of adopting industry codes of practice. The motives for such organization may 
or may not be laudable. The result may be standard form contracts which are identical 
among all commercial enterprises offering the relevant goods or services within a 
particular market. Lowe and Woodroffe, Consumer Law and Practice (1980), pp. 310- 
49; Harvey, The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair Trading (1978), pp. 206-13. 
Where the standard form contracts are negotiated, as is the case in England under the 
Fair Trading Act 1973 (U.K.), c. 41, s. 124, then there is some assurance that the 
reduction in choice may be offset by a corresponding benefit in substantive legal rights. 
Where the standard form contract is simply a result of industry collusion, then the only 
effect is to reduce the range of options open to consumers. 
57 Davis, supra, footnote 11 at pp. 853-6. 
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One studys8 has examined the ability of consumers to under- 
stand the following clause: 
Default: I will be in default if I fail to pay an instalment on time or if I sell or 
fail to take proper care of the collateral or if I move the collateral to another 
location without notifying the seller. 
Only 20% of the subjects correctly identified the meaning of the 
clause when given the following choices: 
If, through your carelessness, the refrigerator becomes damaged and the 
seller finds out about it: 
(a) There is nothing seller can do as long as you make your payments on 
time. 
(b) You will be in default, and seller may repossess the refrigerator. 
(c )  Seller must permit you to have the refrigerator repaired, but if you do 
so, there is nothing more the seller can do. 
(d) Seller can force you to trade it in and buy another one. 
(e) Don't knowlunsure. 
Another less reliable study involved exposing law students to a 
"readable" automobile insurance policy. The students were 
requested to answer a series of simple informational questions 
about the policy including the identity of the persons insured and 
excluded events. None was certain about the answers, and most 
could not offer unambiguous information even after re-examining 
the If we accept that the level of conceptual difficulty of 
information in many consumer contracts will be no lower than 
that of the default provision described above, a level of compre- 
hension necessary to have consumer preferences revealed in a 
competitive market-place is unlikely to be achieved. 
An additional difficulty becomes apparent if one evaluates the 
environment in which plain English contracts are presented to 
consumers. Consumers' ability to process information is apt to be 
directly related, at least at the outset, to the length of time during 
which they are able to consider the information. Plain English 
contracts are likely to be presented to consumers no earlier in the 
contracting process than were traditional contractual documents. 
In addition, the information is presented to the consumer in an 
environment created by the supplier; distractions may range from 
non-contractual promotional material and the "good" itself, to 
background sales pitches by the supplier and his agents. More 
58 Ibid., at p. 879. 
59 Procaccia, supra, footnote 27 at p. 83. 
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importantly, the plain English contract is apt to be presented 
after the agreement has been concluded. Thus in the case of a 
collateral promissory note to secure a consumer sales transaction, 
the consumer would have psychologically committed himself to 
the purchase, the price of the good, the price of the loan and 
perhaps the magnitude of the periodic loan payments. Disclosure 
of the contract terms under the plain English contract takes place 
after this non-legal commitment has occurred, with the result that 
search costs necessary to an effective inter-contract comparison 
of the terms are far less likely to be incurred. Thus plain English 
contracts, which allegedly are designed to influence transactional 
behavior, would be employed in such a way as to transfer inform- 
ation when it is least likely to influence behavior.60 
This phenomenon is simply a manifestation of the behavioral 
perspective described earlier under which transactions are viewed 
as discrete events rather than processes. If one considers that 
purchase decisions are made over time, then the search costs as to 
the expected kind and value of contractual terms will be incurred 
(if at all) to acquire pre-contract information on an informal basis 
from advertisements, popular knowledge of commercial reputa- 
tion, and perhaps from organizations which produce inter- 
contract comparisons of contract goods.61 There is a significant 
risk that this information will come to be considered less relevant 
in a legal evaluation of contractual relationships which are 
consummated by clearly written, readable, plain English 
contracts. 
Even if we were to assume an adequate level of comprehen- 
sion, a consumer must still face the formidable task of assessing 
the value, at least on a relative basis, of the contractual allocation 
of risk.62 This valuation should involve, at the very least, an 
evaluation of the likelihood of the risk occurring, an attempt to 
estimate the financial loss likely to occur as a result,63 and a 
forecast of the time when the risk will occur in order to arrive at 
an appropriate time discount factor. Not all of this information 
can be conveyed in the contract itself; some of the variables will 
60 Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at pp. 715-16. 
6' See text at footnote 7. 
62 See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 417. 
63 Even to know that the kind of loss for which recovery is possible is limited to those 
"likely" to occur presumes that the consumer has digested both historical and more 
recent decisions defining "remoteness" in contract law. 
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be idiosyncratic, while the occurrence of the risk may depend on 
deliberate choice as well as unforeseen events. 
Equally relevant is the difficulty of evaluating these cost factors 
in light of the "unfeasibility of numerical corn par is on^"^^ of low 
risk contingencies. The entire process may be worthless. One 
analyst apparently has concluded that the contractual default 
packages on a $1,300 loan must be perceived to vary by at least 
$850, in order to make it rational for the consumer to agree to an 
additional one percent annual rate of interest on the loan.65 This 
analysis is further reinforced by the argument that consumers 
may misperceive the costs of low risk c~nt ingencies ,~~ leading 
them to focus on the major element of the transaction - price - 
and the physical attributes of the consumer good. The result may 
be that plain English contracts, like contracts in general, may 
suffer from an over-emphasis on price, the major component of 
the transaction, and a complementary under-appreciation of the 
contractual risk contingencies, the classical harsh-terms-low-price 
~ombination.~' 
Once this valuation has been done for one contract term, it 
must be done for all others (since we have assumed that only 
major contingencies are included in plain English contracts) and 
as well for major contingencies which are not expressly allocated 
under the contract. The consumer must then engage in the evalu- 
ation process, assuming it can be carried out accurately, for a 
reasonable cross-section of alternative contract formulations to 
arrive at an inter-contractual comparison of the relative value of 
the mixes of contractual terms available to him. The processing 
costs alone are likely to render any benefit from the task irrele- 
vant. 
To these processing costs we must add search costs. At the very 
least the consumer must invest some time, effort, and perhaps 
money in acquiring information about these alternative contract 
formulations. The ability to compare alternative mixes of 
contract terms as a pre-condition to effective participation is 
made all the more difficult if one adopts, as a premise of the plain 
a Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at p. 728. 
65 Zbid., at pp. 729-30. 
&See Tversky and Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", 
185 Science 1124 (1974); MacKaay, supra, footnote 32 at pp. 128-9; Hirshhorn, supra, 
footnote 7 at p. 5. 
6' Goldberg, supra, footnote 51 at p. 486. 
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English movement, an approach which favours flexibility, 
innovation and experimentation in language, format, style and 
structure. The approach advocated by Mr. Felsenfeld - that 
plain English draftsmen be permitted to work in freedom - can 
only result in a variety of contractual provisions relating to the 
same risk, which are so phrased as to make each of them when 
viewed alone as reasonably clear, but which effectively preclude, 
or at least make prohibitively expensive, meaningful inter- 
contractual comparisons. Standardization of terminology will 
reduce these transaction costs, while individual freedom of 
artistic and linguistic expression may reduce the ability of 
consumers to process comparative contractual information. A 
sophisticated analysis of plain English contracts, and of consumer 
decision-making, suggests that standard comparative data 
describing and evaluating contract terms may be preferable to 
plain English contracts as a technique for facilitating and 
reinforcing consumer decision-making.6* 
Advocates of plain English legislation may respond to these 
criticisms by pointing to the existence of market competition; not 
all consumers need react to certain price-quality combinations in 
order to influence sellers to offer competitive contract terms. 
Rather, as Posner,Trebilcock and others have put it, suppliers of 
contract terms will have to arrange a mix of price and non-price 
terms attractive enough to prevent consumers at the margin from 
switching their business to another supplier.69 Thus we need not 
concern ourselves with the multitude of consumers who may 
exhibit amotivational tendencies, who lack the ability to 
68 See text at footnote 7. Cranston, supra, footnote 39 at p. 109; Leff, supra, footnote 39 at 
p. 33. One author has suggested that consumer decision-making may be improved by 
establishing an "information environment" which will permit comparative data on 
products (and one presumes, on contract terms) to be used by consumers most effec- 
tively. See Bettman, "Issues in Designing Consumer Information Environments", 
[I9751 J. of Cons. Res. 169; Bettman and Zinis, "Information Format and Choice Task 
Effects in Decision Making", [I9791 J. of Cons. Res. 141. Recent evidence suggests that 
consumers prefer comparative standard information to improve prepurchase informa- 
tion. See Claxton and Ritchie, Consumers' Perceptions of Prepurchase Shopping 
Problems and Solutions: Major Problems and Solutions (Consumer Research and 
Evaluation Branch, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1981), p. 31. Standardi- 
zation of form was one of the primary objectives of the Truth in Lending Legislation. 
See Landers, "Some Reflections on Truth in Lending", U. Ill. L.F. 669 (1977), at pp. 
684-7. 
69Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 399; Posner, supra, footnote 7 at pp. 84-8; 
Kornhauser, "Unconscionability in Standard Forms", 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1151 (1976); 
Goldberg, supra, footnote 51 at p. 485. 
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comprehend and evaluate contract terms, or who cannot afford 
the search costs to engage in inter-contractual comparisons of 
non-price terms. Rather, if plain English legislation increases 
information acquisition to some degree, and if elimination of 
express allocation of low risk contingencies reduces the distortion 
in assessing the value of contract terms, we might perceive a 
thickening "of the margin of sophisticated consumers whose 
actions 'make' the market."70 
Unfortunately, this analysis suffers from two serious shortcom- 
ings. The first is that the movement of consumers away from a 
supplier presumes an element of knowledge of the product's 
undesired characteristics. What was or was not a rational 
purchase decision in respect of a contractual term may not be 
discovered for a considerable length of time in the case of some 
long term consumer contracts. Even if an event does occur, is the 
loss due to non-compensation by the other contracting party 
related to the price paid by the consumer, the reliability of the 
commercial supplier, the failure to take out insurance, or to the 
misallocation of risk? In many cases the contingency may never 
arise, and where things are apparently working out, it is next to 
impossible to assume that a consumer will be driven to conclude 
that a paid for allocation of risk to the seller was not worth the 
cost. In other words, participation in the market-place may not 
generate information about the product. Theoretically, when a 
consumer purchases a particular mix of contract terms on a 
regular basis he may discover that his perceptions of the value of 
the particular mix was not accurate. Not only may the imper- 
fection not be discovered (or if discovered, improperly ascribed), 
the effective ability of even a sophisticated consumer to signal his 
supplier that he prefers an alternate mix of terms is certainly 
subject to the same constraints as was the original contract 
70 Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 418; Schwartz, "Sellers Unequal Bargaining Power 
and the Judicial Process", 49 Ind. L.J. 367 (1974); Schwartz, "A Re-examination of 
Non-substantive Unconscionability", 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1978); MacKaay, supra, 
footnote 32 at pp. 133-4. The sophisticated consumer whose behavior may be influenced 
by increased access to information, may be joined by consumer "agents", who 
"negotiate" standard form contracts with commercial enterprises. See A.  Schroeder 
Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [I9741 1 W.L.R. 1308 (H.L.), at p. 1316 per 
Lord Diplock; Green Ltd. v. Cade Bros. Farms, [I9781 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 602 as noted 
by Ziegel in 57 Can. Bar Rev. 105 (1979). This form of standard form contract negoti- 
ation has been institutionalized in England under the Fair Trading Act 1973 (U.K.), c. 
41, s. 124(3). 
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decision. Indeed the switch may be less likely to occur in light of 
the sunk investment of time, money and effort presumably under- 
taken as a prerequisite to the original, sophisticated, ultimately 
unsatisfactory decision. 
The analysis of the marginal consumer may also be misleading 
in so far as it presumes that all consumers will be treated alike. As 
we saw earlier, it may be that different markets in contract terms 
exist for different classes of consumers. Suppliers may "contract 
term discriminate" by agreeing to renegotiate the mix of contract 
terms for the aggressive bargain-seeking, sophisticated consumer 
while retaining the prohibitive search and processing costs of 
inter-contract comparisons for others.'l All plain English 
contracts may do is to increase the numbers of the elite 
information-seeking consumers who know enough to be bought 
off. 72 
For the majority of consumers, plain language contracts may 
simply make us feel better. Feeling better may be valuable, 
indeed that may be all that we are paying for in contracting for 
consumer goods. If that is so, then it makes little difference if we 
derive pleasure from the good or the contract language. And if 
feeling better is worth the price, then the transaction - the 
purchase of the psychological satisfaction of believing that we 
know what we are doing - may be efficient. Yet there are two 
unanswered questions. The first involves the proposition that 
plain language contracts may increase contractual distortions. 
Trebilcock has argued that consumers attach a price to uncer- 
tainty and lack of information by discounting the consideration 
It is remarkable that so little empirical data has been collected on this critical issue. See 
Mueller, "Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study", 69 Mich. L. 
Rev. 247 (1970). 
72 It is true, of course, that the use of plain English contracts may create some offsetting 
benefits. There is some evidence that consumer understanding may, in fact, improve 
where simplified documents are used. Davis, supra, footnote 11 at p. 896. In addition, 
even if consumers do not use the information in transacting, the incidence of contractual 
defaults may decrease if consumers are made aware, even after contracting, of the legal 
consequences of certain behaviour. Similarly, contract terms requiring action once a 
certain event has occurred (such as a term requiring notification of an insurance loss 
within a prescribed time) may be adhered to  with greater frequency where consumers 
are able to  understand terms once a loss has taken place. Finally, the inequality of 
wealth and knowledge between commercial enterprises and consumers brought about 
by the formers' accessibility to legal advice, familiarity with contract terms, and 
expected return on legal investments may be reduced, if the contract terms are compre- 
hensible to a non-expert when a dispute has arisen as to compliance with the contract. 
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they are prepared to pay for entering into undetermined, but 
intuitively adverse risk allocation  arrangement^.'^ The misper- 
ception that consumers may have that they do understand the 
plain English terms offered to them may operate to reduce that 
discount, and thus exacerbate the consumers' misallocations of 
resources. The second point involves an intuitive dissatisfaction 
with the morality of selling only happiness. One must always face 
the question as to whether consumers would, with full knowledge 
of the game, agree to it. 
